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ABSTRACT
In 1954, the Internal Revenue Service stipulated that employer contributions to the health insurance
plans of their employees were to be excluded from employee taxable income. Today, the tax subsidy is a
major feature of the U.S. health care market. This paper examines the initial effects of the tax subsidy on the
demand for health insurance using previously unexamined data from 1953 and 1958. Results suggest that the
tax  subsidy  increased the growth of group insurance, particularly among union members and employed
persons. This is a critical effect because group insurance is not only less expensive than individual insurance,
but it is also easier to obtain, and households with access to group health insurance are far more likely to
purchase  health  insurance coverage than those without similar access. By increasing access to group
insurance, the tax subsidy fostered an increase in the purchase of group health insurance by people who may
not have purchased individual coverage, and generated institutional change as it cemented an employment-
based system of group health insurance in the United States.
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I. Introduction 
Nearly all of the 70 percent of Americans under age 65 who are privately insured receive 
health insurance coverage through their employers; only 4.5 percent of Americans opt to 
purchase individual coverage. (U.S. GAO/HEHS- 97-122, p. 22). The development of 
employment based insurance in the United States can be traced to several factors, including 
governmental policies in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as the early use of employee groups by 
insurance companies to counter adverse selection. Government policies that directly influenced 
the formation of employment-based insurance were a 1942 ruling by the War Labor Board that 
allowed employers to use fringe benefits to attract labor during World War II, and a tax policy 
first introduced in 1943 (and later codified in 1954) that enabled employer contributions to the 
health insurance plans of employees to be exempt from employee taxable income. These pro-
employment based policies, combined with the fact that employment groups were profitable 
ways for insurance companies to sell insurance, led to the rise of the employment-based system 
of private health insurance in the United States. 
Today, employment based group health insurance and the tax subsidy of employer 
contributions to health insurance dominate the U.S. health care market. However, they are also 
the target of critics who argue that curtailing or eliminating the tax subsidy, and severing the link 
between health insurance and employment would do much to alleviate the problems ailing the 
U.S. health care system. Employment-based insurance has been cited as a contributor to job lock 
(Madrian, 1994). Further, the tax subsidy results in a revenue loss to government and may also 
spur rising health care costs. Gruber and Poterba (1996) calculate that about 78 percent of U.S. 
households in the 1987 National Medical Expenditures Survey were directly eligible for the tax 
subsidy on employer contributions to their health insurance plans. Further, they note that the   2 
exclusion of health insurance contributions from the income and payroll tax base in 1994 
resulted in federal revenues being $90 billion lower (Gruber and Poterba, p. 137). Some 
researchers also suggest that the tax subsidy causes people to overinsure, and is a major factor in 
rising health care prices (see Pauly, 1974; Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz and 
Marquis, 1987 for greater discussion).  
The importance of the tax subsidy in the modern health insurance market has led 
researchers to investigate how changing the tax subsidy might alter the demand for health 
insurance. However, little work has been done to analyze the initial impact of the tax subsidy on 
the market for health insurance, and to answer some primary questions: What was the initial 
effect of the tax subsidy on health insurance demand? Could the tax subsidy have engendered 
institutional change and actually shaped the modern market for health insurance? If so, what 
implications does this have for modern policy? Until this point, all of the studies investigating 
the impact of the tax subsidy have used data from the 1960s or later. As a result, none of them is 
able to address these questions about the history of U.S. health insurance. 
In this paper, I use previously unexamined data from before and after the 1954 tax 
changes to present new evidence on the role of the tax subsidy in encouraging the expansion of 
the health insurance market in the 1950s. Results suggest that the implementation of the tax 
subsidy had two distinct, important effects on the market for health insurance.  
First, the tax subsidy encouraged the growth of group health insurance, and sealed the 
institution of insurance in the U.S. as an employment based system. After the codification of the 
tax subsidy in 1954, employed persons and union members had greater access to group health 
insurance. In 1953, 48 percent of Americans had access to group coverage, and 63 percent had 
some type of insurance coverage. By 1958, 67 percent of Americans had access to group   3 
insurance, and 74 percent had private health insurance coverage. Despite the disadvantages of 
this system, group insurance did give more people access to insurance coverage. People who 
have the opportunity to purchase health insurance within a group are more likely to have 
insurance, and they buy more coverage than those who purchase insurance individually. Today, 
evidence exists that employment separation is associated with large reductions in insurance 
coverage (Gruber and Madrian, 1997). Group insurance is less expensive than individual 
coverage because it is associated with lower administrative costs, and is less subject to adverse 
selection. Not only is group insurance less expensive than individual coverage, but it is also the 
case that certain people who could not obtain insurance coverage in the individual market can 
obtain group coverage. In addition, employer contributions to employee health insurance plans 
increased after the tax subsidy, leading households to purchase even more coverage. Thus, the 
tax subsidy may have opened the door to health insurance (and health care) to more people. 
These results indicate that the effects caused by the change in tax policy go beyond the 
increase in insurance purchased generated with the direct tax subsidy. While this effect is 
important, the tax subsidy had more far-reaching implications in that it cemented the 
employment based system of private health insurance in the United States. The remainder of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a history of health insurance before 1954, 
sections III and IV discuss the data and methodology, results are presented in section V and 
section VI concludes. 
II.  The Health Insurance Market before the 1954 Tax Subsidy 
  Health insurance protecting consumers against uncertain medical expenditures is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in the United States. Prior to 1930, most health insurance was 
actually “sickness” insurance. Rather than providing protection against uncertain medical   4 
expenditures, sickness insurance provided income replacement in the event of disability, illness, 
or accident. This relatively low state of medical technology is one reason health insurance did 
not develop in the twentieth century. Before 1920, most patients were still treated in their homes 
by family members. As a result, the major monetary losses associated with illness were generally 
confined to lost income. A 1919 State of Illinois Commission study estimated that lost wages for 
individual wage earners were about four times as great as medical costs (1919, pp. 15-17). The 
size of the wage loss relative to the monetary cost of medical expenditures contributed to the fact 
that sickness insurance policies designed to protect the insured against loss of income developed, 
while actual health insurance remained relatively unknown. The low cost of medical care largely 
made the need for health insurance “… difficult to justify in the context of the period… It was 
felt that the family should be thrifty and save for the rainy day of illness” (Anderson, p. 86). 
  By the late 1920s, the situation had changed dramatically. Medical expenditures were 
rising and becoming more variable as medical technology further advanced. The first Blue Cross 
plan is said to have been founded in 1929 when a group of Dallas teachers contracted with 
Baylor University Hospital to provide three weeks of hospital coverage for a pre-paid fee of 
$6.00 annually. Soon, hospitals everywhere were establishing prepayment plans. The American 
Hospital Association (AHA) encouraged such endeavors, and established a set of guidelines to 
eliminate inter-hospital competition. By 1937, all AHA-approved plans could begin to operate 
under the Blue Cross symbol. Physicians initially opposed any sort of insurance, fearing that 
third-party interference in the doctor-patient relationship would limit their autonomy and 
constrain their incomes. However, as the success and rapid growth of the Blue Cross plans 
demonstrated the demand for pre-paid medical services, physicians sought to develop a form of 
insurance that would protect their financial interests. Thus, they developed their own plans under   5 
the name of Blue Shield. Blue Shield plans required free choice of physician, and ensured that 
physicians could retain their power to price discriminate by charging Blue Shield patients the 
difference between their actual charges and the amount that they were reimbursed by Blue 
Shield.  
Blue Cross and Blue Shield became instantly popular with consumers. In 1940, 1.3 
million people had some form of hospital insurance, with 49 percent of all policies issued by 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield. By 1945, 32 million people had such protection.
1 Initially, the Blues 
had an advantage over the commercial companies in that they enjoyed certain tax-exemptions 
because of their non-profit status. However, their non-profit status also required that they 
community rate policies; i.e. that they charge sicker people the same premium as healthier 
people. In contrast, commercial firms could engage in experience rating, and they focused their 
efforts on insuring healthy groups of people through their employers. Group insurance offered 
insurance companies an effective way to pool risks and avoid adverse selection. Further, it 
enabled them to lower administrative costs. As a result, commercial firms could offer employee 
groups lower rates than Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and the commercial insurance business 
boomed. Figure 1 illustrates the rapid growth of group policies relative to individual policies 
over the period 1940-1960. By 1951, commercial firms had more subscribers than both Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield.
2  
Besides having lower administrative costs and reducing the risks associated with adverse 
selection, some group policies offered by commercial insurance companies may have benefited 
from government tax policy in the 1940s.
3 In 1943, an administrative tax ruling stated that 
                                                 
1 Health Insurance Institute, Source Book of Health Insurance Data, 1970, p. 17. 
2 Health Insurance Institute, 1965 Source Book of Health Insurance Data, p. 14. 
3 Other, non-tax rulings also contributed to the expansion of health insurance. Under the 1942 
Stabilization Act, employers were allowed to offer health benefit packages to secure workers during a   6 
employers’ payments to commercial insurance companies for group medical and hospitalization 
premiums on behalf of their employees were not taxable as employee income.
4 While this tax 
policy further reinforced the efforts of business to attract workers during a period of scarce labor, 
it was very limited in scope and subsequent rulings by the Internal Revenue Service generated 
confusion surrounding the exemption of employer contributions to the health insurance 
premiums of employees. Many people were not eligible for the tax exemption and those who 
were may not have been certain of their eligibility. 
The 1943 ruling was limited in its applicability since it only affected direct employer 
contributions to group plans issued by commercial insurance companies. Private programs of 
employee associations (such as unions), or other private plans were not covered under the ruling, 
nor were employer contributions to the individual health plans of employees. The limited 
applicability of the tax subsidy undoubtedly dampened its effect on health insurance demand, a 
situation that was exacerbated by later rulings by the Internal Revenue Service. Since there were 
no specific statutes in place to guide the tax treatment of employer contributions, IRS rulings 
often seemed contradictory. As the authors of one law review article noted, “… the tax treatment 
of employee health plans was uncertain because of the lack of specific statutory provisions.”
5 
First, there was confusion as to what actually constituted an “insurance” plan. Even plans that 
could meet the criteria of insurance such as contractual enforceability, indemnification, and 
limits of liability were often not considered to be covered under the 1943 ruling.
6 Furthermore, 
the Internal Revenue Service at times seemed to want to reinforce the limitations of the 1943 
                                                                                                                                                             
period of wage and price controls. In 1949, the ability of unions to negotiate health plans for workers was 
cemented when the National Labor Relations Board ruled that for the sake of negotiations, the term 
“wages” included health benefits (Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB (170 F. 2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948))).  
4 3 CCH 1943 Fed. Tax Rep. ¶6587 (1943). 
5 “Taxation of Employee Accident and Health Plans Before and Under the 1954 Code.” Yale Law 
Journal, 1954, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 222-247.   7 
ruling; at other times it seemed to want to broaden its scope. For example, in 1953, one IRS 
ruling emphasized its stand on the limitations of the 1943 ruling, stipulating that employers’ 
contributions to individual health plans were considered to be taxable compensation to the 
employee. In contrast, another 1953 ruling specific to the New York workers’ compensation law 
began to broaden the applicability of the 1943 exemption by extending it to employer 
contributions made to private (i.e. non-commercial) employee benefit plans under the New York 
workers’ compensation laws.
7  
Thus, until 1954, the position of the IRS on the tax exemption was far from clear. 
Confusion about the tax exemption remained until 1954, when the new Internal Revenue Code 
codified and clarified earlier rulings. Prior to 1954, many people were not eligible for the tax 
exemption, and those who were may not have been sure of their exempt status. In 1954, changes 
in the Internal Revenue Code allowed the IRS to offer a concise standard and to eliminate 
substantial confusion about the tax exemption of employer contributions. The 1954 Code 
accomplished primarily three things. First, changes broadened the applicability of earlier rulings 
by extending the tax exemption of employer contributions to include contributions to individual 
health plans and to other plans formed by employee groups, such as unions. After 1954, smaller 
employers for whom group plans were not easily established may have been more likely to 
contribute to the health plans of their employees, and unions may have been more likely to 
sponsor health plans as well. Second, since it clarified earlier rulings, the 1954 IRC reduced 
much of the uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of employer contributions. As a result, 
risk-averse firms unlikely to sponsor a health insurance plan for employees prior to 1954 may 
have done so after the new Code eliminated the uncertainty. Finally, the IRC was likely 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 ibid. 
7 Rev. Rul. 130, 1953 Internal Revenue Bulletin, no. 15, p. 6.   8 
associated with substantial announcement effects, since it provided a statutory basis for the tax 
treatment of employer contributions which were heretofore buried in administrative tax court 
cases. 
III.  The Debate on the Effects of the Tax Subsidy of Employer Contributions 
  Several studies have attempted to estimate the possible effects of the tax subsidy on the 
demand for health insurance, but there is little consensus among them. The price elasticity of 
demand for health insurance is a key factor in this debate. Modern estimates of the price 
elasticity of demand for health insurance range from Holmer’s (1984) calculation of -0.16 to 
Phelps’ (1973) estimate of -2.84. The differences are important because the estimated effect of 
changes in tax policy on health insurance demand depends crucially upon this elasticity. Taylor 
and Wilensky (1983) perform simulations using different values of the price elasticity of health 
insurance demand to illustrate the effect of altering the tax subsidy on health insurance premium 
expenditures. Setting the elasticity equal to -0.2 generates a 7.5 percent decline in total health 
insurance premiums if all exemptions are eliminated. When the elasticity of demand is equal to 
-0.5, expenditures on health insurance decline by 16.7 percent (Taylor and Wilensky, p. 171). 
In addition to providing varying estimates of the price elasticity of demand for health 
insurance, all of these studies employ data collected after the 1954 changes in the Internal 
Revenue Code. As a result, many of the studies that actually attempt to gauge how changes in the 
tax code affect expenditures on health insurance must rely on simulation techniques (Feldstein 
and Friedman, 1977; Taylor and Wilensky, 1983), or make use of periods of tax reform to study 
how changes in tax policy affect health insurance demand (Woodbury and Hammermesh, 1992).  
Until now, these have been the only means by which the effect of the tax subsidy can be 
measured. To conduct a direct test of the impact the implementation of the tax subsidy had on the   9 
market, it is necessary to examine the demand for health insurance both before and after it went 
into effect in 1954. I accomplish this by using the 1953 and 1958 Nationwide Family Surveys 
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). As part of its program to discover 
what kinds of health expenses Americans were incurring and how they were meeting those 
expenses, the NORC canvassed 8,846 members of 2,809 families in July, 1953. The families 
represented an area-probability sample of the non-institutionalized population, subdivided by 
age, gender, income, occupation, family size, area of residence, and region. To study how 
medical expenses and health insurance coverage changed over time, the NORC conducted five 
year re-surveys. Each subsequent survey queried a similar number of people, and was carefully 
designed to preserve comparability between different survey years. In 1958, 2,941 households 
were interviewed. 
With the exception of aggregated statistics that were published at the time of the original 
studies, the individual 1953 and 1958 surveys remain unexamined. However, these are family-
level surveys which are rich in information about the early market for health insurance, and 
which provide crucial insights into how the insurance market developed. Since the surveys 
represent one of the first comprehensive studies of nationwide health insurance, they play an 
important role in understanding the development of the market. Further, since the major changes 
in the Internal Revenue Code dealing with health insurance occurred between the 1953 and 1958 
studies, they also provide a unique opportunity to gauge the effect of the tax subsidy on the early 
health insurance market.   10 
IV.  Using the NORC Data to Estimate the Effect of the 1954 Tax Subsidy  
Measuring the Impact of the 1954 Tax Changes on the Health Insurance Market 
  As noted previously, the effect of the 1954 tax subsidy on the demand for health 
insurance is two-fold. First, it may have increased the number of employers and unions that 
offered group health insurance plans. Since group insurance is less expensive and is easier to 
obtain than individual coverage, an increase in access to group insurance would generate an 
increase in the number of the households with insurance coverage. Second, the tax changes 
directly made health insurance less expensive for those households with employers who 
contributed to their health plans because employees did not have to pay income taxes on these 
contributions. As a result, the “price” of health insurance to the employee fell, which should lead 
in an increase in the amount of coverage purchased.  
  To test these effects, I first examine the impact of the tax changes on the probability that 
a person had the opportunity to purchase group insurance coverage. If the tax subsidy did lead 
more employers and more unions to sponsor health insurance plans, then access to group 
insurance should have increased among employed persons and union members in 1958 relative 
to 1953. The second effect of the tax subsidy on increasing the amount of coverage purchased 
can be examined in two ways. First, probit estimation can be used to identify what factors 
influenced a household’s decision to purchase health insurance coverage or not. This is 
especially important in determining how access to group insurance affects a household’s decision 
to purchase health insurance coverage. In addition, it can shed some light on whether the tax 
changes influenced a household’s decision to purchase health insurance or not. Second, while the 
tax changes may have induced some people to purchase coverage who would not have otherwise, 
it is more likely that households who had already made the decision to purchase health insurance   11 
purchased a higher level of coverage after the tax changes were enacted. As a result, tobit 
estimation is used to gauge the effect of the tax changes on the amount of coverage purchased. 
Estimating the Impact of the Tax Subsidy on Access to Group Insurance 
  Simple comparisons of the samples in 1953 and 1958 reported in Tables 1 and 2 suggest 
that more people had access to group insurance in 1958 than in 1953. In 1958, 67 percent of 
households had the opportunity to purchase health insurance through a group plan, compared to 
48 percent of households in 1953. The 1954 tax changes resolved uncertainty surrounding the 
tax-exempt status of employer contributions, so more employers to sponsor plans. In addition, 
after 1954, union-sponsored plans that employers contributed to were also eligible for the 
exemption. Thus, access to group insurance should have increased in 1958 relative to 1953. 
To specifically test this hypothesis, I estimate a probit model where the dependent 
variable is equal to one if the household had the opportunity to purchase group insurance, and 
zero otherwise. Independent variables include socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, 
including industry, occupation, age, union membership, and employment status. Of particular 
interest are the variables union and employed. Union is equal to one if the household head is a 
union member, and employed is equal to one if the head of the household is employed. Union is 
included because it may have been the case that they exerted pressure on employers to provide 
group health insurance plans, or themselves sponsored employee insurance plans, particularly 
after 1954 when tax exemption for employer contributions to such plans was assured. To test 
whether or not access to group insurance increased among union members and employed persons 
(the direct beneficiaries of the 1954 tax subsidy), I pool the 1953 and 1958 samples and include a 
year dummy equal to one in 1958. By interacting the year dummy with union membership and 
employment status, I can determine whether access to group insurance changed significantly   12 
between 1953 and 1958. Specifically, if the estimated coefficients on employed*year and 
union*year are statistically significant, then employed persons and union members were more 
likely to have access to group insurance in 1958 than in 1953.  
After eliminating observations with missing values for variables in the regression, the 
sample in 1953 has 2238 observations, while 2165 observations are in the 1958 sample. Thus, 
the pooled sample that is used to estimate the probit model contains 4403 observations. Results 
of the probit estimation, reported in Table 3, support the hypothesis that the 1954 tax changes 
increased access to employment-based group insurance. The estimated coefficients on 
union*year and employed*year are statistically significant, suggesting that union members and 
employed persons in 1958 had a higher probability of having access to group insurance than they 
did in 1953. A change in the employed*year dummy variable from zero to one leads to a 18.6 
percent increase in the probability that the household had access to group health insurance in 
1958 compared to 1953. The estimated coefficient on the union*year dummy suggests that 
nearly a union members in 1958 were roughly 15 percent more likely to have access to group 
health insurance than their counterparts in 1953. Clearly, more employers and more unions were 
sponsoring group health insurance plans after 1954. While the 1954 tax subsidy is not the only 
factor that led to an expansion of group insurance, it certainly provided many employers and 
unions with an additional incentive to sponsor group plans. 
Estimating the Demand for Health Insurance Coverage 
Given that the tax changes in 1954 increased access to group plans, how did this affect 
the probability that a household purchased health insurance coverage? To examine the effect of 
the tax subsidy on the demand for health insurance coverage, I first estimate a probit model to 
determine the factors that determine whether or not a household purchases health insurance. A   13 
tobit model is then used to examine the factors that influence the amount of insurance coverage 
purchased by a household.  
The demand for health insurance coverage is a function of socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics, as well as the costs associated with obtaining insurance coverage. 
The costs associated with obtaining insurance coverage can be divided into two parts, the loading 
factor (load) on a policy, and the access costs associated with obtaining coverage. The loading 
factor on a policy is the percentage increase in the actuarially fair premium that insurance 
companies charge to cover expenses associated with the policy. The load on group insurance 
policies is lower than on individual policies because there are significantly lower administrative 
expenses associated with group insurance than with individual insurance. Employers may deduct 
the premium from employees’ paychecks (eliminating the need for insurance companies to bill 
individuals), and insurance agents do not have to meet with people individually. 
In addition to the load on a policy, other costs associated with obtaining coverage include 
the access costs of seeking out insurance, as well as the insurability of a person of obtaining 
coverage. Thus, even after controlling for the lower explicit load on group insurance, the 
transactions costs associated with enrolling in group insurance are much lower than those 
associated with having to seek out an insurance company and obtain coverage individually. 
Unlike an individual plan which requires that consumers contact an agent, complete a detailed 
medical history, and possibly undergo a physical examination, a typical group insurance 
application requires only that an individual fill out a simple enrollment card. Households who 
have to merely sign up with their employer are probably more likely to have coverage than 
households who do not have the same opportunity. At a time when health insurance premiums 
were fairly low relative to other goods, these transactions costs may have been a significant   14 
portion of the total cost of insurance. In addition, group coverage is “… written without evidence 
of individual insurability when the individuals who comprise the group are bound together by 
some broad interest” (Faulkner, p. 199). Thus, it may be the case that some individuals who are 
considered “uninsurable” individually may be able to obtain group coverage since they do not 
have to undergo a rigorous screening process.
8 
To illustrate how individual households (denoted by the subscript i) may choose to 
allocate their budgets between spending on other goods, (ci) and spending on health insurance, 
(hi), I offer a straightforward model of utility maximization which provides a basis for the 
empirical relationship between consumption and spending on health insurance. Suppose a 
household has a probability π  of suffering a sickness which causes an income loss of $S, either 
due to medical expenditures or due to lost wages. To protect against this loss, the household can 
purchase a health insurance policy which pays $hi in the event of illness. The cost of the policy is 
equal to the actuarially fair premium multiplied by  ) 1 ( i λ + , where  ) , 0 [ ∞ ∈ i λ  is the loading fee 
on the policy, or the percentage increase in the actuarially fair premium that an insurance 
company charges to cover its administrative costs. Thus, the total premium of the policy is  i i h p ⋅  
where  ). 1 ( i i p λ π + =  In addition to the premium, an individual who purchases health insurance 
coverage faces a fixed transaction cost, F, associated with obtaining coverage. The transactions 
costs associated with obtaining individual coverage are much greater than those associated with 
obtaining group coverage. While F may not affect the level of insurance coverage purchased at 
an interior solution, it will affect the size of the household’s feasible set. Thus, a household 
                                                 
8 This suggests a third reason why group insurance policies are typically less expensive than individual 
policies. Insuring younger, healthier groups of employees reduces the risks associated with adverse 
selection, so that the actuarial premium of a group policy is typically less than similar coverage available 
under an individual policy.   15 
which purchases health insurance if transactions costs are low may opt not to purchase insurance 
if transactions costs are high. 
In an expected utility framework, a household purchases health insurance if and only if 
its expected utility with health insurance coverage exceeds its expected utility without health 
insurance coverage. The price of the composite consumption good has been normalized to unity 
for convenience. The household’s decision problem can be written as: 
[1]  )) 1 ln( ( ) 1 ( )] , ( E[ i i i i i h S c c h c u + + − ⋅ + ⋅ − = α π π , 
s.t.  i i i m F h p c ≤ + + . 
Note that in this framework, the household is assumed to be risk-averse (so that they may 
purchase an actuarially unfair premium), but utility is well-defined even in the event that hi = 0. 
In addition, α i can be thought of as the individual’s reservation price for insurance, and is a 
function of the individual’s socioeconomic and demographic characteristics such as income, age, 
marital status and education. 




















so that the amount of health insurance a household buys is: 










=  and 
[3.2]  hi = 0    otherwise.   16 
I specify the reservation price as αγ ii i zu =+ exp( ) , where zi is a vector of these socioeconomic 
and demographic characteristics, and ui is distributed normally with a mean of zero and a 
variance of  2 σ . 
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that contribute to a household’s 
insurance decision include family size, age, income, region, race, occupation, and whether or not 
the individual has access to group insurance. Whether or not the person has a high school degree 
is also included since an individual’s level of education may also be important (see Dewar, 
1998). As noted previously, access to group insurance is important for three reasons. First, group 
insurance is less expensive than individual insurance, due to lower administrative costs. Second, 
people who may not have been able to purchase insurance in the heavily screened individual 
insurance market could have more easily purchased insurance through a group. To control for 
access to group insurance, I include the dummy variable group in the estimation. Group is equal 
to one if the person had access to group insurance, regardless of whether group insurance was 
actually purchased. 
The marginal tax rate of a household may also have affected the household’s health 
insurance coverage decision. In effect, the tax subsidy lowered the cost of employer provided 
health insurance, and this benefit increased with a household’s marginal tax rate. Assuming a full 
compensating differential, the employee pays for the entire premium through lower wages 
regardless of the amount of employer contribution.
9 However, while the employee pays the 
entire premium, he or she enjoys a tax subsidy only on the explicit employer contribution. This 
tax subsidy offsets the loading factor, thus making the “price” of one dollar of coverage less 
expensive. The insurance premium faced by the employee is thus equal to   17 
[5]  Premium = (1 - t)E + e, 
where t is the employee’s marginal tax rate, E is the employer’s contribution to the premium and 
e is the amount of the premium paid by the employee. As a family’s marginal tax rate rises, 
employer provided health insurance becomes less expensive, leading to an increase in the 
amount of coverage purchased. To capture the effect of the tax subsidy on the demand for health 
insurance, I include a measure of the household’s marginal tax rate (mtr) in the estimated 
equation
10. A priori, the estimated coefficient on mtr should be positive, and given the substantial 
amount of uncertainty surrounding the tax policy of employer contributions to employee health 
insurance premiums prior to 1954, the effect of the marginal tax rate variable in 1953 should be 
small relative to its effect in 1958. To test this directly, I also include the dummy variable 
mtr*year, which is equal to the value of the household’s marginal tax rate in 1958 and zero 
otherwise. If the tax subsidy did increase the probability that a household purchased insurance, 
the coefficient on mtr*year should be positive and statistically significant. 
An additional effect of the tax changes in 1954 may have been to encourage more 
employers to not only sponsor group health insurance plans for their employees, but to contribute 
to (or contribute more to) employee health plans. As shown in table 2, employers more 
frequently contributed to employee coverage and more frequently paid the entire premium in 
1958 compared to 1953. Only seven percent of households in 1953 had an employer who paid 
their entire health insurance premium. Seventeen percent had partial contributions to their 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Evidence exists for such compensating differentials (see Fishback and Kantor, 1995 for a brief 
overview). 
10 Unfortunately, in the 1953 sample income is upper-truncated at $10,000 so that the measure of the 
marginal tax rate for individuals with income over $10,000 is not directly observed. To preserve 
comparability between the 1953 and 1958 samples, I artificially truncate income in 1958 at $10,000 and 
include a dummy variable called overten, which is equal to one for households with income of $10,000 or 
greater. In addition, to preserve comparability with the 1953 data, I upper truncate income in 1958 at 
$10,000 as well. The results do not change substantially when I use actual reported income in 1958.   18 
insurance premiums, and 77 percent of people with insurance did not have any employer 
contributions. In contrast, 18 percent of households in 1958 had their entire premium paid by 
their employers, 25 percent had partial contributions, and 58 percent paid their entire premium 
by themselves. After the tax change, more employers contributed to the health care plans of their 
employees, and employers who had already been contributing seem to have contributed more. 
The ideal variable to gauge the effect of increasing contributions is a measure of increasing 
contributions. Unfortunately, the NORC samples report employer contributions to employee 
health plans as “none,” “some,” or “all.” Further, these indicator variables cannot be used in the 
probit estimation because the presence of employer contributions perfectly predicts insurance 
purchase
11. To help capture the effect of the tax changes in increasing the amount of employer 
contributions, I include the interactive dummy group*year, which equals one in 1958 for a 
household with access to group insurance. If the estimated coefficient on this variable is 
statistically significant, it means that households with access to group insurance in 1958 are more 
likely to purchase insurance than households with access to group insurance in 1953. One reason 
for this may have been additional employer contributions that occurred after the implementation 
of the tax subsidy in 1954.  
V.  Results of Estimations 
The data means reported in Table 1 suggest that the 1954 tax law contributed to a rise in 
the number of households with health insurance coverage: The percentage of households with 
health insurance coverage rose from 63 percent in 1953 to 76.4 percent in 1958. However, since 
the 1954 tax law was not the only change that occurred between 1953 and 1958, the effect of the 
tax subsidy on a household’s decision to purchase insurance can be more carefully analyzed 
                                                 
11 These variables can, however, be used to determine the amount of coverage (if any) a household 
purchased, as discussed below.   19 
using probit estimation. In this way, the direct effect of the tax subsidy on the probability that a 
household purchased insurance, as well as the indirect of the tax subsidy in increasing insurance 
purchase by promoting access to group insurance can both be measured. The dependent variable 
in this model is binary: hi = 0 if the individual does not insure, hi = 1 if the individual does 
insure. Results from the probit estimation are reported in Table 4. 
Overall, the results in Table 4 indicate the importance of having access to group 
insurance in determining whether or not a household had insurance coverage. A change in the 
group dummy variable from zero to one leads to a 46 percent increase in the probability that a 
household purchased insurance, even after controlling for the effect of the marginal tax rate. The 
significance of this variable reinforces the idea that households with access to group insurance 
were far more likely to purchase insurance coverage in the 1950s than households without access 
to group coverage. As noted previously, group health insurance was not only less expensive than 
individual coverage, but it was also much easier to obtain. In addition, the estimated coefficient 
on group*year is positive and statistically significant, indicating that households with access to 
group insurance in 1958 were more likely to purchase insurance than households with similar 
access in 1953. One reason for this may be because the 1954 tax changes contributed to the 
expansion of tax-exempt employer contributions to employee health premiums. However, after 
access to group insurance is controlled for, it does not appear that a household’s marginal tax 
rate affected their decision to purchase health insurance or not. The estimated coefficients on 
both mtr and mtr*year are statistically insignificant. It may be that the strongest effects of the tax 
subsidy were to encourage the growth of group insurance and to encourage greater employer 
contributions, both of which led more people to purchase health insurance. The direct tax 
savings, which were fairly small on average due to the low cost of premiums relative to income,   20 
probably did not cause people to decide to purchase health insurance. Other variables that have a 
positive, statistically significant effect on the probability of insurance purchase include family 
size, age, and education, while black households had a statistically significantly lower 
probability of purchasing health insurance coverage. 
Clearly, the tax subsidy increased access to group insurance, particularly among union 
members and employed persons. Given the dominant influence of access to group insurance in 
determining health insurance status, how might this increase in the ability of households to 
purchase group insurance have influenced the number of people who gained health insurance 
between 1953 and 1958? One means of measuring this effect is to use a technique that 
decomposes the change in access to group insurance between 1953 and 1958 into two 
components. The first component is that which results from differences in sample characteristics 
between the two years, and the second is that which occurs because of differences in the 
estimated coefficients (Oaxaca, 1973; Even and Macpherson, 1990; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994). 
One reason estimated coefficients might differ between the years is if a structural change 
occurred that altered the weight households give to various factors when making decisions about 
insurance purchase, such as how changes in the tax laws may have affected access to insurance 
among employed persons and union members. 
To perform the decomposition, separate probit estimations are performed for 1953 and 
1958.
12 In 1958, the predicted probability of access to group insurance increased by 19.43 
percentage points from that of 1953 (from 47.46 to 66.89 percent). Following Even and 
Macpherson (1990), the fraction of the change attributable to structural changes occurring in the 
estimated coefficients while holding the sample characteristics constant is 10.68 percentage   21 
points of the 19.43 percentage point increase, or 55 percent. Table 5 shows that the change in 
access to group insurance is even larger for union members and employed persons. Among union 
members, access to group insurance increased 14.82 percentage points from 1953 to 1958, while 
access to group insurance increased 12.57 percentage points for employed persons.  
For the whole sample, if having access to group insurance increases the likelihood that a 
household purchases insurance by 46 percent, and if access to group insurance attributable to 
structural changes in the coefficient estimates increased by 10.68 percentage points between 
1953 and 1958, then a simple back of the envelope calculation suggests that the increase in 
access to group insurance generated by the tax subsidy could explain up to 41 percent (5.5 
percentage points) of the 13.52 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of buying 
insurance from 1953 to 1958.
13 These results clearly show that the increase in access to group 
insurance between 1953 and 1958 is an important initial effect of the changes in tax policy in 
1954.  
Measuring the Impact of the Tax Changes using Tobit 
While the probit estimation provides clear information as to the factors that determine 
whether or not a household buys insurance, it may not fully capture the effect of the tax changes 
in 1954. While access to group insurance is an important determinant in whether or not people 
purchase health insurance coverage, it is not clear that after access to group insurance has been 
controlled for, the additional exemption of employer contributions from household income tax 
would induce people who would otherwise not purchase health insurance to purchase coverage. 
Thus, it may not be surprising that the estimated coefficient on mtr*year is not statistically 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 These estimations are the same as for the pooled model but do not include the year dummy variables. 
Since the actual results are not relevant to the purpose here, they are not reported but are available upon 
request.   22 
significant in the probit equation. Households probably did not base their decision to actually 
purchase health insurance or not on the possibility of a tax exemption. What is more likely is that 
once households had made the decision to purchase health insurance coverage, the exemption of 
employer contributions would enable them to buy a greater amount of coverage. Further, 
employers increased their contributions to employee premiums, possibly enabling households to 
buy additional coverage. Because the NORC samples provide data on the amounts of coverage 
purchased by households, it is possible to examine the effect of the 1954 tax changes not only on 
the probability that a household purchased insurance, but also on how much coverage a 
household purchased. Thus, I use tobit estimation examine the effect of the tax subsidy on the 
amount of expected health insurance coverage purchased by a household.  
In the NORC samples, measuring the amount of health insurance coverage purchased by 
each household is complicated because of the way insurance benefits are reported in the surveys. 
The reported benefits include a variety of different attributes that must be put into comparable 
units before they can be summed to an aggregate value of coverage. In the 1950s, people who 
wanted to purchase insurance chose from a menu that included a per diem hospital benefit 
ranging from $3 to $22, for which they paid a premium for their selected level of coverage based 
on their age and gender. If they wished to add surgical protection to their coverage, they selected 
a surgical rider that paid a specified benefit (ranging from $20 to $450), and added the premium 
for the rider onto the premium for their hospital coverage. The household’s insurance coverage 
cannot be determined by simply adding a $3 per diem benefit to a $400 surgical rider to get $403 
in coverage. This method would give too much weight to the surgical coverage when surgery 
was a much lower probability event than hospitalization. Weights must be determined for each 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Calculated as (.4627+.0504)*.1068=0.055 percentage points of the .1352 percentage point change in 
predicted insurance purchase between 1953 and 1958.   23 
feature of coverage that take into account differences in the likelihood of payment, which can 
then provide an expected value of the insurance coverage. A reasonable method for determining 
these weights is to examine how the insurance companies priced the various features.  
When insurance companies in a competitive market rate policies, they charge a premium 
equal to the expected value of the coverage (what they expect to pay to consumers who have the 
policy), multiplied by a load ratio to cover their administrative costs. If a policy is actuarially fair 
(if there is no load), the premium on a policy is equal to the amount the insurance company 
expects to pay to the policyholder over the policy term. An actuarially fair premium is thus equal 
to the probability that the insured person will suffer a loss, multiplied by the amount of the loss. 
Because of this relationship between premiums and the expected benefit to the insured under the 
policy, the premium schedules of insurance companies can be used to determine universal 
weights for such diverse features as surgical riders and per diem hospital benefits.  These weights 
can then be used to calculate a measure of expected value for the features of coverage selected in 
each individual household.  
To do this, I use archival rate data for 1953 and 1958 from the nationwide insurance 
company, Mutual of Omaha. The Mutual of Omaha premium schedules provide the premium 
charged to a person for a given benefit level, conditional on the person’s age and gender. For 
example, in 1958, a 35 year-old male who selects a $10 per day hospital benefit would pay 
$18.00 annually. If he elected to have a $225.00 surgical rider added to his policy, he would pay 
an additional $9.00, for an annual total of $27.00. If his 35 year-old wife children elected to 
purchase the same level of coverage, she would be charged $28.00 for the hospital benefit and an 
additional $12 for the surgical coverage. Using the Mutual of Omaha premium schedules, I 
estimate the weights that Mutual of Omaha used to determine a person’s premium conditional on   24 
their age and gender by regressing the premium schedule on a constant and the benefit schedule 
for each age/gender classification: 
[6.1]  ) benefit   hospital ( ˆ ˆ ) premium   hospital ( h
ij
h
ij ij β α + =  
[6.2]  ) benefit   surgical ( ˆ ˆ ) premium   surgical ( s
ij
s
ij ij β α + = , 
where ij refers to the age (i) and gender (j) of the individual, and h and s refer to the hospital 
schedule or the surgical schedule. The results of the estimations are reported in the appendix. 
To determine the expected value of coverage for an insured household in the NORC 
sample, I apply the estimates of the  ij ij
ˆ ˆ β α   and   to the data on a household by household basis. If a 
household reports a hospital benefit of $10 per day, and a surgical benefit of $200, I calculate the 
expected value of coverage under their policy by inserting their reported benefit levels into either 
equation [6.1] or equation [6.2] for their relevant age and gender. The total value of expected 
coverage for the household is the sum of the value for each covered individual. In 1953, the 
mean of expected coverage for all persons is $18.27. For only those people who purchased 
insurance, the mean of expected coverage is $62.92. In 1958, the mean of expected coverage for 
all persons is $49.09. The mean of the variable conditional on insurance purchase is $103.46. 
Once the expected coverage under a particular policy has been determined, I pool the data and 
estimate the equation using tobit to measure the effect of various factors, including the marginal 
tax rate, on the amount of health insurance coverage purchased by households.
14 
                                                 
14 One shortcoming of this procedure is that many families knew they had insurance but did not know 
their benefit levels. As a result, it is impossible to compute the expected value of their insurance coverage, 
and they are eliminated from the sample. Out of 2165 observations in 1958, only 971 remain after 
dropping observations in which families do not know their benefit levels or the amount of their premium 
paid by their employer. In 1953, the original sample of 2238 falls to 1171 after dropping observations for 
missing benefit levels/employer contributions. A probit analysis of insurance conducted using the smaller 
data set does not differ substantially from the probit done using the full set of data, although the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient on highmtr is greater, as is the effect of union membership in   25 
However, given the nature of the data used in the tobit estimation, a more accurate means 
of measuring the effect of the tax changes can be used. As noted previously, one effect of the tax 
subsidy would be to increase the frequency and the amount of employer contributions to 
employee health plans. To control for this, I include a dummy variable (contribution) that is 
equal to one if the employer contributes to the household’s insurance plan. In addition, I include 
contribution*year, which is equal to one for employer contributions in 1958. The interactive 
dummy provides a test of whether households receiving employer contributions in 1958 
purchased more coverage than similar households receiving contributions in 1953, which would 
occur as a direct result of the 1954 tax changes.  
Table 6 reports the estimates of the tobit equation using the expected dollar amount of 
health insurance coverage as the dependent variable. Overall, the results from the tobit 
estimation reinforce those of the probit, and demonstrate that the tax changes did have an effect 
on the amount of coverage households purchased in 1958 relative to 1953. Once again, the 
estimated coefficient on the dummy variable group is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that the potential expenditures of households with access to group health insurance 
were $81.97 greater than the potential expenditures of households who did not have access to 
group coverage, even after controlling for the presence of employer contributions. Clearly, 
access to group insurance plays an important role not only in determining the likelihood that a 
person has coverage, but also in determining the amount of coverage that a person has. In 
addition, the estimated coefficient on the variable controlling for employer contributions is 
positive and statistically significant, supporting the hypothesis that even after controlling for the 
effect of group insurance, households who received employer contributions to their health 
                                                                                                                                                             
1958. Full probit results from estimating the smaller sample are available in the appendix, as are the 
descriptive statistics from the smaller sample.    26 
insurance premiums purchased more coverage. Potential expenditures for households with 
employers contributing to their policies were $48.60 higher than for households who did not 
receive employer contributions. Further, the positive, statistically significant coefficient on 
contribution*year suggests that households who received employer contributions in 1958 
purchased more coverage than similar households in 1953, and the positive, statistically 
significant coefficient on mtr*year suggests that people in higher tax brackets purchased more 
coverage than their 1953 counterparts. These results indicate that the tax subsidy did have a 
statistically significant, positive effect in increasing the amount of health insurance coverage 
households bought. 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper suggests that the initial effects of the 1954 tax subsidy go beyond that of 
increasing the relative amount of health insurance coverage purchased by decreasing its relative 
price. Results indicate that the tax subsidy promoted the growth of group insurance, and 
correspondingly enabled more households to gain access to health insurance coverage than 
before the changes occurred. Further, after 1954, people with access to group insurance were 
even more likely to purchase coverage, and people with employer contributions purchased more 
coverage than they did before. In the NORC sample, the number of people with access to group 
insurance rose 18.9 percentage points, from 47.8 percent to 66.7 percent. Both union members 
and employed persons in 1958 were statistically significantly more likely to have access to group 
health insurance than either group in 1953. Results indicate that up to 41 percent of the rise in the 
predicted probability of having insurance over the period may be attributable to changes in 
access to group insurance.   27 
To some degree, this increase in access to group insurance may have made health 
insurance markets more complete by reducing risks of adverse selection and by lowering the 
administrative costs of insurance companies. These savings are in turn reflected in lower 
premiums for consumers relative to those of individual insurance coverage. Furthermore, people 
who may not have been able to buy insurance individually (in effect facing an infinite price) 
might have been able to do so with the less stringent group enrollment process. Results show that 
households with access to group insurance were 46 percent more likely to have health insurance 
than households without the opportunity to purchase group insurance. The effect of having 
access to group insurance is a strong one, then and now. If the tax subsidy encouraged the 
growth of group insurance, then it did far more than just lower the cost of insurance coverage by 
exempting employer contributions from income taxes— it also enabled many more people to 
have access to health insurance. If it is indeed the case that the effect of the tax subsidy in 
contributing to the growth of employment-based group insurance was important, then the tax 
subsidy may have actually engendered institutional change, and shaped the modern health 
insurance market. Given this, any modern policy decision that affects the tax subsidy must be 
evaluated not only with respect to how it would affect the relative price of health insurance, but 
also with respect to what ramifications it might have on group insurance and access to health 
insurance coverage.   28 
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Age  49.240  14.863 19 90  46.292  14.649 18 90 
Age
2  2645 1536.341  361  8100  2358 1436.505  324  8100 
Covg  18.27  35.251  0  197.93 49.09 62.97  0  348.45 
Education  0.338  0.473 0 1  0.289  0.453 0 1 
Employed  0.810  0.393 0 1  0.861  0.347 0 1 
Family  Size  3.113 1.678  1  13 3.363 1.742  1  14 
(Family Size)
2  12.508 14.323  1  169 14.341 16.076  1  196 
Female  Head 0.193  0.394 0 1  0.117  0.322 0 1 
Group  0.478  0.500 0 1  0.667  0.471 0 1 
Income  4187 2824  100  50000 5694 4108 37  57000 
Insured  0.629  0.483 0 1  0.764  0.424 0 1 
Lodge  Member  0.197  0.398 0 1  0.255  0.436 0 1 
Married  0.763  0.425 0 1  0.821  0.384 0 1 
MTR  0.173 0.102  0  0.75 0.179 0.081  0  0.38 
Overten  0.061  0.240 0 1  0.103  0.304 0 1 
Premium  6.703 4.107  0  35.27 6.688 5.270  0  31 
Black  0.103  0.304 0 1  0.086  0.280 0 1 
Trunc.  Income  4156 2584  100  10000 5282 2720 37  10000 
Union  Member  0.331  0.471 0 1  0.332  0.471 0 1 
Occupation Dummies            
Professional  0.150  0.357 0 1  0.112  0.316 0 1 
Farmer  0.106  0.308 0 1  0.06  0.237 0 1 
Clerical  0.053  0.224 0 1  0.093  0.290 0 1 
Sales  0.045  0.207 0 1  0.050  0.219 0 1 
Craftsman  0.174  0.379 0 1  0.209  0.407 0 1 
Service  0.077  0.266 0 1  0.076  0.265 0 1 
Laborer  0.061  0.240 0 1  0.073  0.259 0 1 
Operative  0.169  0.375 0 1  0.193  0.394 0 1 
Industry Dummies           
Agriculture  0.121  0.326 0 1  0.079  0.270 0 1 
Mining  0.105  0.307 0 1  0.026  0.159 0 1 
Manufacturing  0.252  0.434 0 1  0.315  0.464 0 1 
Finance  0.022  0.148 0 1  0.038  0.192 0 1 
Service  Industry  0.115  0.319 0 1  0.155  0.362 0 1 
Public  0.041  0.199 0 1  0.061  0.239 0 1 
Trade  0.134  0.341 0 1  0.144  0.351 0 1 
Transportation  0.071  0.256 0 1  0.092  0.289 0 1 
Regional Dummies             
Northeast  0.260  0.439 0 1  0.279  0.449 0 1 
Northcentral  0.283  0.450 0 1  0.244  0.43 0 1 
Southeast  0.146  0.353 0 1  0.149  0.356 0 1 
Southcentral  0.168  0.374 0 1  0.171  0.377 0 1 
Mountain  0.043  0.203 0 1  0.035  0.184 0 1 
Pacific  0.100  0.300 0 1  0.118  0.322 0 1 
* n = 2238 in 1953, n = 2165 in 1958.   31 
Table 2:  Percent of Households with Employer Contributions to Health Insurance 
 
Household Reports:  1953  1958 
No Contribution by Employer  77%  58% 
Partial Contribution by Employer  17%  25% 
Full Contribution by Employer  7%  18% 
   32 
Table 3: Results from Pooled Probit Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable: Access to Group Health Insurance (0, 1) 
 
Variable  Marginal Effect  Std. Error  P-Value 
Family  Size  0.0152 0.0173 0.3800 
(Family Size)
2  -0.0028 0.0019 0.1440 
Age  0.0137 0.0038 0.0000 
(Age)
2  -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Income  0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Employed  0.0794 0.0393 0.0420 
Union  Member  0.1015 0.0257 0.0000 
Lodge  Member  -0.0357 0.0226 0.1130 
Black  -0.1222 0.0314 0.0000 
Professional  0.1681 0.0292 0.0000 
Clerical  0.2368 0.0297 0.0000 
Sales  0.1130 0.0385 0.0060 
Craftsman  0.0862 0.0297 0.0050 
Service  0.1276 0.0345 0.0010 
Laborer  0.0806 0.0380 0.0400 
Operative  0.1746 0.0292 0.0000 
Agriculture  -0.1250 0.0410 0.0020 
Manufacturing  0.2729 0.0236 0.0000 
Finance  0.0139 0.0543 0.7990 
Service  Industry  -0.0251 0.0338 0.4560 
Public  0.0625 0.0428 0.1550 
Trade  -0.0281 0.0339 0.4060 
Transportation  0.1929 0.0309 0.0000 
Education  0.0340 0.0205 0.0980 
Northeast  0.0021 0.0447 0.9620 
North  Central  -0.0719 0.0452 0.1100 
Southeast  -0.0245 0.0475 0.6040 
South  Central  -0.1198 0.0477 0.0110 
Pacific  -0.1167 0.0501 0.0190 
Overten  -0.2626 0.0384 0.0000 
Union*Year=58  0.1498 0.0360 0.0000 
Employed*Year=58  0.1860 0.0477 0.0000 
Year=58  -0.0612 0.0474 0.1980 
 
*Marginal effects are reported as the change in probability for an infinitesimal change in each continuous 
variable. Dummy variables are reported as the change in probability as the dummy moves from 0 to 1. 
Mean of dependent variable is 0.571. N=4403, LRI=0.279. 
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 Table 4: Results from Pooled Probit Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable: Health Insurance Purchase(0, 1) 
 
Variable  Marginal Effect  Std. Error  P-Value 
Family  Size  0.0473 0.0150 0.0020 
(Family Size)
2  -0.0056 0.0016 0.0000 
Age  0.0111 0.0030 0.0000 
(Age)
2  -0.0001 0.0000 0.0010 
Income  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Education  0.0368 0.0168 0.0320 
Black  -0.0883 0.0281 0.0010 
Professional  0.0093 0.0246 0.7080 
Clerical  0.0933 0.0258 0.0020 
Sales  0.0883 0.0275 0.0060 
Craftsman  0.0584 0.0202 0.0060 
Service  0.0636 0.0238 0.0150 
Laborer  0.0059 0.0299 0.8440 
Operative  0.0991 0.0194 0.0000 
Overten  -0.0974 0.0444 0.0180 
Northeast  0.0817 0.0341 0.0240 
North  Central  0.0579 0.0349 0.1120 
Southeast  0.0322 0.0373 0.4050 
South  Central  0.0575 0.0350 0.1230 
Pacific  -0.0189 0.0431 0.6540 
Group  0.4627 0.0206 0.0000 
Group*Year=58  0.0504 0.0292 0.0940 
MTR*Year=58  0.1944 0.1484 0.1900 
MTR  -0.0020 0.1184 0.9860 
Year=58  -0.0265 0.0290 0.3620 
 
*Marginal effects are reported as the change in probability for an infinitesimal change in each continuous 
variable. Dummy variables are reported as the change in probability as the dummy moves from 0 to 1. 
Mean of dependent variable is 0.695. N=4403, LRI=0.3733. 
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Percentage Change in Access to Group 
Insurance Due to Changes in Estimated 
Coefficients 
Whole Sample  55% 
Union Members Only  76% 































*Access to group insurance rose by 19.43 percentage points over the period. Numbers in the table 
represent the portion of the increase in access to group attributable to changes in the coefficients (the 
unexplained decomposition =  58
53 58
58
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) performed over the whole sample, and then 
separately across union members only and then employed persons.   35 
Table 6: Results of Tobit Estimation, 1953 and 1958* 
 
Dependent Variable: Coverage 
 
Variable  Estimated Coefficient  Std. Error  P-Value 
Family Size  21.4474  3.7575  0.0000 
(Family Size)
2 -1.3699  0.3881  0.0000 
Age 2.0644  0.8245  0.0120 
(Age)
2 -0.0150  0.0084  0.0740 
Income 0.0040  0.0013  0.0030 
Education 4.5229  4.7323  0.3390 
Black -13.3387  6.9756  0.0560 
Professional 9.7022  6.9385  0.1620 
Clerical 14.4900  8.9572  0.1060 
Sales 23.9023  9.4667  0.0120 
Crafts 11.6710  6.2106  0.0600 
Service 9.2686  8.0814  0.2520 
Laborer -0.9133  8.8743  0.9180 
Operative 18.3797  6.4906  0.0050 
Overten -20.5533  9.5318  0.0310 
Northeast -15.7775  9.2230  0.0870 
North Central  -4.6242  8.9441  0.6050 
Southeast -9.0874  9.2143  0.3240 
South Central  -2.7447  9.1404  0.7640 
Pacific -14.5552  10.1237  0.1510 
Group 81.9690  5.2381  0.0000 
Employer Contribution  48.6005  7.6558  0.0000 
Contribution*Year 16.3407  8.9084  0.0670 
MTR*Year 103.3772  44.6318  0.0210 
MTR 16.6829  34.1544  0.6250 
YEAR -0.6397  8.4730  0.9400 
Constant -199.0892  23.8668  0.0000 
SIGMA 68.3296  1.9081   
n = 2123. Pseudo R
2 = 0.1224. Mean of dependent variable is $32.34.   36 


















Age  50.984 15.879 19  90 46.670 15.527  18  90 
Age
2  2851 1663  361  8100 2419 1537  324  8100 
Coverage  18.268 35.251  0  197.934 49.093 62.970  0  348.45 
Education  0.276 0.447 0  1 0.257 0.437  0  1 
Employed  0.741 0.438 0  1 0.826 0.379  0  1 
Family  Size  2.974 1.706 1  13 3.391 1.880  1  14 
(Family Size)
2  11.753 14.675  1  169 15.033 18.674  1  196 
Female  Head  0.227 0.419 0  1 0.106 0.308  0  1 
Group  0.268 0.443 0  1 0.471 0.499  0  1 
Income  3492 2857  100  50000 4957 4095 37  57000 
Insured  0.290 0.454 0  1 0.475 0.500  0  1 
Lodge  Member 0.166 0.372 0  1 0.230 0.421  0  1 
Married  0.717 0.450 0  1 0.826 0.379  0  1 
MTR  0.150 0.111 0  0.75 0.160 0.092  0  0.38 
Overten  0.044 0.204 0  1 0.074 0.262  0  1 
Premium  7.036 4.127  0.5  35.27 6.156 5.070  0.85  27.18 
Black  0.135 0.342 0  1 0.103 0.304  0  1 
Trunc.  Income  3450 2487  100  10000 4623 2752 37  10000 
Union  Member 0.260 0.439 0  1 0.252 0.435  0  1 
Occupation  Dummies          
Professional  0.168 0.374 0  1 0.100 0.300  0  1 
Farmer  0.149 0.356 0  1 0.094 0.292  0  1 
Clerical  0.044 0.206 0  1 0.061 0.239  0  1 
Sales  0.035 0.184 0  1 0.049 0.217  0  1 
Craftsman  0.143 0.350 0  1 0.206 0.405  0  1 
Service  0.088 0.283 0  1 0.087 0.281  0  1 
Laborer  0.070 0.255 0  1 0.093 0.290  0  1 
Operative  0.132 0.338 0  1 0.184 0.388  0  1 
Industry Dummies           
Agriculture  0.173 0.379 0  1 0.132 0.338  0  1 
Mining  0.099 0.299 0  1 0.027 0.162  0  1 
Manufacturing  0.178 0.383 0  1 0.277 0.448  0  1 
Finance  0.019 0.136 0  1 0.036 0.186  0  1 
Service  Industry  0.112 0.315 0  1 0.165 0.371  0  1 
Public  0.036 0.186 0  1 0.059 0.235  0  1 
Trade  0.136 0.343 0  1 0.133 0.340  0  1 
Transportation  0.056 0.231 0  1 0.066 0.248  0  1 
Regional  Dummies           
Northeast  0.194 0.395 0  1 0.179 0.384  0  1 
Northcentral  0.264 0.441 0  1 0.247 0.432  0  1 
Southeast  0.185 0.389 0  1 0.179 0.384  0  1 
Southcentral  0.215 0.411 0  1 0.225 0.417  0  1 
Mountain  0.046 0.210 0  1 0.046 0.210  0  1 
Pacific  0.094 0.292 0  1 0.120 0.326  0  1   37 
Table A2: Pooled Probit Estimation of Health Insurance Purchase, Limited Sample* 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Health Insurance Purchase (0, 1) 
 
Variable  Marginal Effect  Std. Error  P-Value 
Family  Size  0.0526 0.0262 0.0450 
(Family Size)
2  0.0526 0.0262 0.0450 
Age  -0.0061 0.0028 0.0310 
(Age)
2  0.0134 0.0053 0.0120 
Income  -0.0001 0.0001 0.0190 
Education  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Black  0.0142 0.0314 0.6490 
Professional  -0.0661 0.0393 0.1050 
Clerical  0.0544 0.0459 0.2270 
Sales  0.1140 0.0656 0.0730 
Craftsman  0.1326 0.0690 0.0470 
Service  0.0759 0.0416 0.0620 
Laborer  0.1054 0.0538 0.0440 
Operative  0.0088 0.0550 0.8720 
Overten  0.1636 0.0449 0.0000 
Northeast  -0.1446 0.0520 0.0150 
North  Central  -0.0536 0.0619 0.3980 
Southeast  -0.0027 0.0626 0.9650 
South  Central  0.0744 0.0673 0.2600 
Pacific  0.0995 0.0672 0.1310 
Group  -0.1160 0.0608 0.0800 
Group*Year=58  0.5463 0.0305 0.0000 
MTR*Year=58  0.1395 0.0560 0.0110 
MTR  0.4488 0.2799 0.1090 
Year=58  0.0703 0.2079 0.7350 
  -0.0750 0.0536 0.1640 
*Marginal effects are reported as the change in probability for an infinitesimal change in each continuous 
variable. Dummy variables are reported as the change in probability as the dummy moves from 0 to 1. 
Mean of dependent variable equals 0.374. LRI = 0.3941.   38 




Age Category  Estimate of α  Estimate  of  β  
under 17  -0.7346  1.3731 
17-58 -1.5714  2.7626 
59-65 -0.3857  2.9813 




Age Category  Estimate of α  Estimate  of  β  
under 17  0  0.04 
17-65 0  0.04 







Hospital Benefits, Male 
Age Category  Estimate of α  Estimate  of  β  
18-24 0  1.52 
25-29 0  1.60 
30-34 0  1.72 
35-39 0  1.80 
40-44 0  2.20 
45-49 0  2.60 
50-55 0  3.00 
56-59 0  3.20 
over 60  0  3.40 
 
 
Surgical Benefits, Male 
Age Category  Estimate of α  Estimate  of  β  
18-63 0  0.04 
over 63  0  0.07 
   39 
 
Hospital Benefits, Female 
Age Category  Estimate of α  Estimate  of  β  
18-24 0  2.20 
25-29 0  2.40 
30-34 0  2.60 
35-39 0  2.80 
40-44 0  3.00 
45-49 0  3.20 
50-55 0  3.40 
56-59 0  3.40 
over 60  0  3.40 
 
 
Surgical Benefits, Female 
Age Category  Estimate of α  Estimate  of  β  
18-63 0  0.053 
over 63  0  0.067 
 
 
Hospital Benefits, Minors under age 17 
Age  Estimate of α  Estimate  of  β  
under 17  0  1.00 
 
 
Surgical Benefits, Minors under age 17 
Age  Estimate of α  Estimate  of  β  
under 17  0  0.32 
 
* All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.   40 
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